Downward mobility drives support for far-right in Europe

Across a wide swath of developed democracies, far-right parties have experienced a surge in electoral success in the past decade. Far from seeing their support ebb and flow, far-right parties have seen their votes steadily rise. 

Despite appearing on the fringes of the political scene in the 2000s, far-right parties now appear in national governments in Italy and Hungary, poll in first place in France and the UK, and form the official opposition in Germany. With support for the far right continuing to grow, many scratch their heads over the cause of this phenomenon. 

According to a new study co-authored by Hertie School Professor Mark A. Kayser, voters who experience downward mobility, ending up in lower-status occupations than their parents, are significantly more likely to support far-right parties.

Published in Comparative Political Studies, the paper offers the most comprehensive empirical assessment to date of how intergenerational status loss influences for the far-right. Drawing on nearly two decades of data from the European Social Survey, covering 11 Western European countries from 2002 to 2020, the authors reveal a consistent pattern: people who fall down the social ladder are more likely to vote for far-right parties.

“We find strong evidence that status loss, not just economic hardship or cultural resentment, predicts support for far-right parties,” says Kayser. “This helps explain why these parties have surged in popularity across very different national contexts and income groups.”

Occupational decline, not just discontent

The study addresses a key question in political science: why are far-right parties gaining ground in many wealthy democracies? Previous research has debated whether economic hardship or cultural anxiety plays the dominant role. Mark Kayser, who co-authored the paper alongside University of British Columbia Professor Alan Jacobs, argues for a more nuanced explanation rooted in the concept of social status: a combination of economic position and societal esteem.

Rather than relying on perceptions or attitudes, the authors measure long-term, objective status change by comparing respondents’ current occupational status to that of their parents. Their analysis shows a clear trend: the further someone falls in occupational rank compared to their parents, the more likely they are to vote for far-right parties.

The asymmetry of mobility

In the study, occupational status levels were based on a four-tier scale, from high-status professional and managerial roles to low-skilled working-class jobs, allowing the researchers to measure whether individuals had moved up or down the social hierarchy relative to their parents.

The study found that among voters who dropped one occupational status level compared to their parents, 9.7% voted for a far-right party. For those who dropped three levels, the share rises to 12%, compared to 7.9% among those whose status remained the same.

“It’s not just where you are, but where you’ve come from and whether you’ve fallen that matters politically”

While downward mobility increases far-right support, upward mobility has little effect. This asymmetry, the researchers argue, highlights that status loss is politically more potent than status gain.

“It’s not just where you are, but where you’ve come from and whether you’ve fallen that matters politically,” says Kayser.

The paper also explores how status loss shapes political attitudes. Downward mobility was strongly associated with anti-system sentiment and dissatisfaction with democracy, but only weakly with anti-immigrant views. This suggests that disappointment with a lack of personal progress, rather than cultural hostility, may be a more decisive factor in voting for the far-right.

Implications for democracy

Many scholars have sought to draw attention to the economy’s role in driving radicalisation. While the authors see the rise of the far right as grounded in multiple factors, their paper suggests that short-term economic precarity could be a leading reason. 

As global economic forces such as automation and globalisation reduce the chances for upward mobility, more people may come to view the political system as failing them, fuelling support for parties that promise to disrupt the status quo.

“Downward Mobility and Far-Right Party Support: Broad Evidence” was published in Comparative Political Studies. Read the full article here: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00104140251349663 

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